In this paper I attempt to show that mathematical economics is unreasonably ineffective. Unreasonable, because the mathematical assumptions are economically unwarranted; ineffective because the mathematical formalizations imply nonconstructive and uncomputable structures. A reasonable and effective mathematization of economics entails Diophantine formalisms. These come with natural undecidabilities and uncomputabilites. In the face of this, I conjecture that an economics for the future will be freer to explore experimental methodologies underpinned by alternative mathematical structures. The whole discussion is framed within the context of the celebrated Wignerian theme: The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences.
Lesk acquiesced, but did go on to point out that: "Of course, the change in title had absolutely no effect on my remarks." ibid.
There was a substantive point Lesk was trying to make with the intended title where
Ineffective was emphasised in a Wignerian context. Lesk had felt that: "...biology lacks the magnificent compression of the physical sciences, where a small number of basic principles allow quantitative prediction of many observations to high precision. A biologist confronted with a large body of inexplicable observations does not have faith that discovering the correct mathematical structure will make sense of everything by exposing the hidden underlying regularities. .... A famous physicist once dismissed my work, saying: 'You're not doing science, you're just doing archaeology!' .... [I] t emphasizes a genuine and severe obstacle to applications of mathematics in biology." ibid.
It is one of the illusions, enthusiastically maintained by mathematically competent economists, that economics is capable of a similar `magnificent compression' of its principles to `a small number of basic principles' that has led to the persistence faith in the application of the mathematical method in economics. Keynes famously thought `if economists could manage to get themselves thought of as humble, competent people, on a level with dentists, that would be splendid' (Keynes, 1930, p.373) . I would happily settle for economics being compared to archaeology and our scientific activity placed on a level with that of the archaeologist. It would be a noble analogy. As a famous mathematician -who also made interesting contributions to analytical economics (Schwartz, 1961) -observed that the veneer of mathematics tends:
" [T] o dress scientific brilliancies and scientific absurdities alike in the impressive uniform of formulae and theorems. Unfortunately however, an absurdity in uniform is far more persuasive than an absurdity unclad." Schwartz, 1986, p.22 .
The aim I have set forth for myself, in this essay, is to unclothe some of the uniforms of this empress, in her economic incarnations as a mathematical economist, and show her naked torso for what it is: ineffective and non-constructive in the strict technical sense of formal recursion theory and constructive mathematics; but also to try to unclothe a few of her generals and foot-soldiers and show them in their splendid, unclad, absurdities. Others have unclothed other elements of mathematical economics in related ways and it is also possible to tell a story in terms of Unreasonably Undecidable and Incomplete economic theories 1 . In particular, the impressive works by what I may call the Brazilian School of Newton Costa, Francisco Doria and Marcelo Tsuji (da Doria, 1994, Tsuji, da Costa and Doria, 1998) , a lifetime research program by Alain Lewis (aborted for various inexplicable reasons) and also recent work by Kislaya Prasad (2002) where, especially, the kind of questions I raise in this paper are raised in the context of game theory and its underpinnings in aspects of Nash equilibria. 2 However, to keep the narrative within a concise scheme, I have had to be narrowly focused on a selected set of issues in this paper and, hence, have not harnessed the interesting results in works by these and other authors for the purpose of buttressing this story.
Wigner's essay was admirably concise (only 16 pages long) and dealt with a host of vast and deep issues within that brief number of pages. It was divided into five subsections, in addition to a brief introduction. 3 I shall, to some extent, mimic that structure. Hence, the next section in this essay will try to summarise the salient points underlying alternative mathematical traditions. Wigner's brilliant lecture was delivered at a time when real analysis reigned supreme and formalism of one variety or another ruled, implicitly or explicitly. 4 There was, if not universal agreement, blissful ignorance of alternative traditions that may have provided different perspectives on the formalized natural sciences. Hence, Wigner could happily confine his discussions on `What is Mathematics?' to just a page and a half! 5 Today such conciseness is almost impossible, even from the point of view of the knowledge of the mathematically minded economist. Classical real analysis is only one of at least four mathematical traditions within which economic questions can be formalized and discussed mathematically. Non-standard, constructive and computable analyses have been playing their own roles in the formalization and mathematization of economic entities -but mostly within the closure of neoclassical economic theory.
Wigner's discussion of Physics and Physical theories are predicated upon the explicit and implicit fact that such theories have organising and disciplining criteria such as invariance, symmetry and conservation principles (cf. also Wigner, 1964 and McCauley, 2004) . Lesk, on the other hand, by confining his discussion to that part of Molecular Biology which has come to be called Computational Molecular Biology, was able to single out the restraining and guiding hands provided by the laws of physics and chemistry, without subscribing to any kind of reductionism. He coupled these underpinnings to the mechanism of evolution and the role of chance in the latter, in particular, as organising principles to demonstrate the effectivity of mathematical theorising in Computational Molecular Biology.
These organising principles operate, of course, also in Molecular Biology in general; it is just that, by concentrating on the computational subset, Lesk was able to characterize the canonical mathematical methods used as being sequence alignment and structure superposition.
If I was to follow Lesk's strategy, then I have one of four possibilities. I can either work within the framework of General Equilibrium Theory (GET) as the core of neoclassical economics and choose its computational `subset', i.e., Computable General Equilibrium theory (CGE) and discuss the unreasonable effectiveness, or not, of mathematics inside these, narrow but well-defined citadels of application of mathematics in economics. The second possibility is to choose the computable subset of either GET or some other part of economic theory, not necessarily neoclassical in spirit, and highlight the effectivity of mathematical theorising in these subsets. The third alternative is to confine my attention to that amorphous practice, increasingly called Computational Economics, and discuss the effectivity of mathematical theorising in this field. I rule out the latter two alternatives in view of a lack of clearly defined disciplining criteria that would make it possible to provide a decent discussion within the confines of a single essay. The fourth alternative, that which appeals most to me, would be to work within the field of what I have come to call Computable Economics, but that would mean a discussion of the effectiveness of mathematics in economics, a story I have told elsewhere in greater detail (Velupillai, 2000) . Therefore, I choose, in §3, to define the `economic theory' to which mathematics has been applied ineffectively, and unreasonably so, as GET and confine myself to brief remarks on other, related areas of economics aspiring to the status of a mathematical discipline.
I try, in §4 to suggest that we return to the tradition of the methodologies and epistemologies of the natural historian -perhaps, implicitly, also that of the dentist and the archaeologist. This final section is also a reflection of the way mathematics might develop and to speculate that the possible scenarios would reinforce the return of economics to what it once was: Political Arithmetic and to the fold of the enlightened national accountant.
`For Poetry Makes Nothing Happen....' 6 -Mathematical Traditions.
"Among the abstract arts music stands out by its precise and complex articulation, subject to a grammar of its own. In profundity and scope it may compare with pure mathematics. Moreover, both of these testify to the same paradox: namely that man can hold important discourse about nothing." Michael Polanyi: Personal Knowledge (Polanyi, 1958, p.193; italics added The equivalence between the two propositions entails an acceptance of the deductive validity of: ¬(¬A)ñA. Brouwer himself came to reject the validity of this principle and, forty years after the initial publication of his famous result, reformulated the proof without reliance on it (Brouwer, 1952) .
The second example illustrates a widely used non-constructive principle, most conspicuously utilised in the 'proof' of the Bolzano-Weierstrass Theorem (Dummett, 1977, pp.10-11) , which is implicitly assumed in all `constructions' of equilibria in CGE models. The reason for some mathematicians to object to proofs of the sort in the second example is that it shows that one or the other of two specific conditions hold without specifying a means to determine which of them is valid in any specific set of circumstance. It is as if the mathematician in his journey along those characterising `routes' comes to a fork in the pathway and is told that one or the other of the alternatives will lead to a specified destination, but is not given any further information as to which one might do so. Is she to take both, simultaneously or one after the other -even along mathematical pathways that are routinely The definition has severed all connections with the meaning attributed to the word `function' in ordinary discourse; there is little sense in which it can be understood to `perform a task'.
The idea of a `rule', a `procedure', encapsulated within the historical definition of the ideaconcept -of a `function' has disappeared. This is best illustrated by an example (cf. Moschovakis, 1994, p.41 Then, there is the class of computable functions, the domain of the recursion theorist, acting under the discipline of the Church-Turing Thesis. The most direct way of describing or characterising these functions -although not the mode that I find most congenial -is to say that they are that subset of the functions defined in classical mathematics which can be implemented on an ideal digital computer -i.e., the Turing Machine. . However, this will achieve no particular purpose beyond that which has been achieved with the above few considerations and characterisations for the following reasons. Given the Hardy-Dummett characterisation of mathematics and the activity of the mathematician in terms of `the systematic construction of complex deductive arguments', it was inevitable that there would be some dissonance in the meaning and interpretation to be attached to `construction' and the acceptability or not of valid deductive rules for the `construction'. Depending on the kind of deductive rules and constructions accepted as valid, there are different ways to characterise mathematics and mathematicians. I have highlighted a few of the possible ways to do thisbut many other ways could have been attempted with equal ease, which would have resulted in a many-splendoured world of possible mathematics and mathematicians. The main point to note is that it is not a monolithic world, characterised by one concept of `proof' and a single way of `constructing patterns' from an inflexibly determined set of deductive rules.
A Glittering Deception of Entrappers & Entrapped
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"And he wondered what the artist had intended to represent (Watt knew nothing about painting), ... a circle and a centre not its centre in search of a centre and its circle respectively, in boundless space, in endless time (Watt knew nothing about physics) ... ." Samuel Beckett: Watt (Beckett, 1963, p.127) ; italics added.
Given the availability of a variety of mathematical structures that could have been harnessed for the formalization of economic theory, why and how did economists choose the one formalism that was most conspicuously devoid of numerical content
15
? This question, to be answered, requires a detailed historical study of source material in disciplined ways, and is, in any case, outside the particular scope of this paper. What is, however, clear beyond any doubt is the crucial role played by existence proofs in the modern mathematization of economic theory. To this may be added also the role of separating hyperplane theorems, in view of the importance of optimization as a disciplining criterion in economic analysis. I shall, therefore, for the purposes of the discussion in this paper have these two issues in mind although, paradoxically, the latter -separating hyperplane theorems -is less crucial in a formal sense than the former -fixed point theorems. At the very outset I would like to make it very clear that, contrary to widespread and popular belief that topological fixed point theorems are the only way to formalize economic equilibrium existence problems, this is demonstrably false. By `demonstrably false' I mean the following: it is easy to formalize, constructively or recursion theoretically, the fundamentals of economic theory -rational agents and their choice behaviour -and seek equilibria using perfectly valid constructive or computable fixed point theorems. For example, at a most basic level, the problem of formalizing rational expectations, showing its existence and deriving a learning scheme to achieve it can all be framed recursion theoretically and constructively (cf. Velupillai, 2004) .
In their seminal textbook on mathematical economics, Arrow and Hahn (1971) A subsidiary question I pose, next, is whether Scarf's program can be carried through successfully. The claim, by leading applied economists, is that it has been carried through successfully and GET is, now, an eminently applicable field, with clear computational and numerical content.
My answer to the first question is that the results are decisively sensitive to the kind of mathematics used. The answer to the second question is that the Scarf program cannot succeed in its aim to constructivise the equilibrium existence problem of GET, i.e, the constructive and computable content of CGE is vacuous.
Before I consider the unreasonable ineffectiveness of mathematical general equilibrium theory, there are a few ghosts to rekindle, a phantom to resurrect and some to lay to rest. The first ghost that deserves a rekindling is the existence problem -and from two points of view. Firstly, is it really necessary to pose, as a mathematical, problem, the question of equilibrium existence in formal economic theory? Hicks, arguably the doyen of economic theory for the 20th century, did not think so: With an eye at some questions to be raised below, let me ask
16
: why `at positive prices' and not `at positive integer or rational prices'?
Next, even if there is a satisfactory answer to the first question -in spite of the weight of Hicks' vision and stand -was it necessary to formulate the equilibrium existence problem as a fix point problem? Smale did not think so:
"We return to the subject of equilibrium theory. The existence theory of the static approach is deeply rooted to the use of the mathematics of fixed point theory. Thus one step in the liberation from the static point of view would be to use a mathematics of a different kind. Furthermore, proofs of fixed point theorems traditionally use difficult ideas of algebraic topology, and this has obscured the economic phenomena underlying the existence of equilibria. Also the economic equilibrium problem presents itself most directly and with the most tradition not as a fixed point problem, but as an equation, supply equals demand. Mathematical economists have translated the problem of solving this equation into a fixed point problem. I think it is fair to say that for the main existence problems in the theory of economic equilibrium, one can now bypass the fixed point approach and attack the equations directly to give existence of solutions, with a simpler kind of mathematics and even mathematics with dynamic and algorithmic overtones." Smale, 1976, p.290 ; bold emphasis added.
A phantom to resurrect, in this connection, especially in the context of the forum for which this essay was prepared, is that a supreme example of equation systems that were solved without recourse to any kind of fixed point theorem, were those presented by Piero Sraffa (Sraffa, 1960) . Of course, the Sraffa systems were not of the supply=demand variety; nevertheless, they were equilibrium systems of a sort. 
Proposition 2: The Bolzano-Weierstrass Theorem is invalid in Constructive Mathematics.
Claim 2: The Hahn-Banach Theorem is invalid in its classical form in Constructive and
Computable analysis. Suppose we add, to the above six supplementary `riders', the following Claim on the Uzawa Equivalence Theorem (Uzawa, 1962) :
Claim 4: The Uzawa Equivalence Theorem is neither constructively nor computably valid.
Then, in conjunction with the invalidity of the Bolzano-Weierstrass Theorem (Proposition 2, above), Claim 4 implies that the constructive content of CGE models, and their computational implications for economic policy analysis, are vacuous.
A similar exercise can be carried out for every sub-field of economic theory to which the mathematical method has been applied -in particular, game theory. It will be a tedious exercise but I suspect that, eventually, such an exegesis can even be automated! The general strategy would be to identify the key mathematical axioms, theorems and concepts that underlie any particular mathematics applied to a sub-field of economic theory and, then, to investigate their constructive, computable, non-standard or real analytic nature. Thus, for example, a seemingly innocuous application of dynamical systems theory in endogenous theories of the business cycle would also be susceptible to such an exegetic exercise. Any use of the Cauchy-Peano theorem in the existence theory for differential equations will fall foul of the failure of the validity of the Bolzano-Weierstrass Theorem in Constructive mathematics.
This is because the Bolzano-Weierstrass Theorem is equivalent to the Ascoli Lemma which, in turn, is used to simplify the proof of the Cauchy-Peano Theorem.
In passing, it must, of course, be pointed out that fixed point theorems did not enter economic analysis by way of the existence problem of general equilibrium theory; the entrance points were game theory and growth theory -both at the hands of von Neumann. For reasons of space, my remarks on these two issues will have to be brief. First of all, as regards game theory, I have already tried to make a case for recasting every game theoretic problem in economics as an Arithmetical Game (cf. Velupillai, 2000, ch.7) . This implies that their solutions can be reduced to Diophantine decision problems, in analogy with the equation approach to the economic equilibrium existence problem. Secondly, in the case of growth theory, the original fixed point problem of a minimax system was `simplified' into a separating hyperplane problem. But as pointed out above, the separating hyperplane theorem, or the Hahn-Banach theorem, has neither an exact equivalent formulation in constructive mathematics nor is it known, at present, whether it is valid in computable analysis (cf. for example Metakides and Nerode, 1982) . However, the fact remains that growth theory is a problem of self-reproduction and self-reconstruction, and to that extent the theory can felicitously be reformulated as a recursion theoretic problem and the standard, numerically implementable, fixed point theorem of recursion theory can be applied.
What kind of lessons are we to draw from this particular exercise in exegesis? There is almost no better way to phrase the main lesson to be drawn than in the words of a leading "..like most other fields of human enquiry mathematics has tended to define itself to be concerned with just those questions that its methods can successfully address. And since the main methods traditionally used in mathematics have revolved around doing proofs, questions that involve undecidability and unprovability have inevitably been avoided. …. The main point .. is that in both the systems it studies and the questions it asks mathematics is much more a product of its history than is realized." ibid, p.792.
If economics is formalized using traditional mathematics, then, naturally, it will be crippled or enhanced by the poverty or richness of the history that determines the latter, as the natural sciences have been, a point emphasised by Ulam and Wolfram; but also, the extent to which 'mathematics has tended to define itself to be concerned with just those questions that its methods can successfully address', will distort the economic theory that is formalized using that particular kind of mathematics. I have tried, within the limited span of the previous sections, to make clearer than is traditionally done in mathematical economics, the traditionally invoked methods of mathematics and their limitations (and, to some extent their historically evolved nature). Much more can, of course, can be said and discussed about these aspects but it is satisfying to find my interpretations echoed in the stances taken by Ulam and
Wolfram.
The place and kind of mathematical principles and practice I envisage, in an economics for the future, outlined below and, partly, implicit in the way ineffectivity of standard mathematical economics was discussed above, is such that it will be perfectly sensible and practicable to consider it a particular implementation of the message in NKS, especially as developed in chapter 11: The Notion of Computation and chapter 12: The
Principle of Computational Equivalence (ibid).
If I might try to compress the essential methodological message in NKS, for the purpose of a brief justification of the feasibility of the embedding mentioned in the footnote above, then it would be something like the following. On the basis of a mathematical philosophy of the formal meaning of computation, underpinned by recursion theory, Wolfram fundamental ontological assumption, in an almost (early) Wittgensteinian way, is that everything is to be viewed as a process or as the realization of a process and (ibid, p.715):
All processes can be viewed as computations
With this as his basic epistemological vision, he enunciates the basic principle of NKS to be In other words, he extracts the implicit processes intrinsic to or implied by any mathematical law or formalism and uses his PCE, and its phenomenological consequence, computational irreducibility to evaluate their effective and predictable content to show the simplistic, unrealistic and undesirable nature of mathematical formalisms in traditional science. However, his message can be read as a way of showing the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in traditional science. This is because, his aim is to show that the appearance of the success of traditional science, using the criteria of simplicity in the laws that encapsulate the phenomena to be explained and the predictions that are extracted from them, is due to a subterfuge: that of concentrating on using analytically solvable mathematical formalisms to encapsulate natural laws and thereby ignoring the processes that have to be used to evaluate the solution to any such formalism. In this way, the methodology of traditional science circumvented the implications of computational irreducibility and, hence, ignored PCE.
The exercise I have attempted in the previous sections is very similar to Wolfram's broader agenda and can be embedded within his scheme -if I were to accept his ontology. I
am not entirely sure I can, at this juncture, subscribe to it or to its underpinnings. I do not confine myself to algorithms or computations in a strictly recursion theoretic way; I have left the door open to constructive mathematics and, hence, to algorithms -computational processes -that are not subject to the Church-Turing thesis and to the possibility of relying on intuitionistic logic. However, I am nor unhappy not unwilling to embrace his methodology and epistemology; indeed, I have done so quite willingly in my other writings, except that I base myself on a minor variant of his computational irreducibility, known in algorithmic complexity theory as incompressibility. Further excursions into these issues will complicate and expand this paper and its message beyond reason and space and I must leave it for a different exercise (cf. Albin, Foley and Velupillai, 2004) .
To return, now, to the themes of the previous section it is surely true that, more than any other single factor, it is the obsession with the existence problem that seems to have condemned mathematical economics to ineffectivity. But this is not as serious a problem for the mathematization of economic theory in an effective mode as it might appear at first sight.
Though it may require hard work -in the sense of having to re-learn alternative mathematical paradigms -it is not, intrinsically an impossible task. Nor will the knowledge and traditions gained in training ourselves to think formally and formalise routinely go to waste. It is almost a routine task to formalize economic theory recursion theoretically or constructively and to highlight its natural quantitative underpinnings explicitly.
On the other hand, it is not for nothing that the great master of modern economic theory, sometimes even in its mathematical mode, John Hicks, never tired of emphasising the importance of the accounting tradition in economic analysis, particularly dynamic economics:
"In all its main forms, modern economic dynamics is an accounting theory. It borrows its leading concepts from the work which had previously been done by accountants (with singularly little help from economists); and it is in accordance with this that social accounting should be its main practical instrument of application." Hicks, 1956, p. 221. Somewhere between the Political Arithmetician, alias the National Income Accountant, and the Financial Analyst, alias the Accountant, lies the task of the quantitative economist's analytical role and none of the theoretical or applied tasks of these two pragmatic and paradigmatic figures requires anything more than arithmetic, statistics and the rules of compound interest. These, in turn, require nothing more than an understanding of the conditions under which systems of equations can and cannot be solved. But what kind of quantities do these equations encapsulate as parameters, constants and variables? 21 Surely, the kind of quantities that enter the equations of the Political Arithmetician and the Accountant cannot be other than rational or natural numbers -negative and non-negative?
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. Eminent theorists, working in core areas of economic theory -price theory and monetary theoryhave made this point in interesting ways over the past half a century (Gomory and Baumol, 1960 , Clower & Howitt, 1978 and Scarf, 1990 ).
For example, in one of the most fundamentally innovative discussions on a core area of monetary economics, Clower and Howitt remarked that a realistic analysis of the
Transactions Theory of the Demand for Money implied the use of proof techniques involving
`the use of number theory -a branch of mathematics unfamiliar to most economists' (ibid, p.452, footnote 3). The reason such proof techniques had to be used was that they imposed simple, realistic, constraints on the domain of analysis -integer units. Their starting point was that individual traders produce, sell and purchase only discrete, integer, units of one stock-flow good -the obvious and natural place to begin. Once this is done, the economic problem automatically becomes a Diophantine decision problem, although the unwary reader may not immediately recognise this aspect when they are formulated as integer programming problems (as in Scarf, op.cit). But in a classic paper on a traditional problem in economic theory, pricing, Gomory and Baumol made the connection between integer programming and Diophantine problems right at the outset:
"A surprisingly wide range of problems including Diophantine problems …. can be given an integer programming formulation." ibid, p.521; italics added Why these hints, implorations and suggestions were not taken more seriously in the practice and teaching of economic analysis, I do not know; perhaps inertia is the simplest explanation. In any case, I cannot see any role for real numbers in quantitative economics and, hence, none whatsoever for real analysis and the proof techniques allied to it. Richard
Hamming wondered, similarly, about the appropriate kind of numbers for probability theory 23 : "Thus without further examination it is not completely evident that the classical real number system will prove to be appropriate to the needs of probability. Perhaps the real number system is: (1) not rich enough -see non-standard analysis; (2) just what we want -see standard mathematics; or (3) more than is needed -see constructive mathematics, and computable numbers. ... What are all these uncountably many non-computable numbers that the conventional real number system includes?.... The intuitionists, of whom you seldom hear about in the process of getting a classical mathematical education, have long been articulate about the troubles that arise in the standard mathematics .... What are we to think of this situation? What is the role in probability theory for these numbers which can never occur in practice? " Hamming, 199, italics "The group of problems which I propose to describe belong to that Cinderella of pure mathematics-the study of Diophantine equations. The closely guarded secret of this subject is that it has not yet attained the status and dignity of a science, but still enjoys the freedom and freshness of such pre-scientific study as natural history compared with botany. The student of Diophantine equations ... is still living at the stage where his main tasks are to collect specimens, to describe them with loving care, and to cultivate them for study under laboratory conditions. The work of classification and systematization has hardly begun. .... ... An inviting flora of rare equations and exotic problems lies before a botanical excursion into the Diophantine field." Temple, 1958, p.233; italics added. Why are they intractable? How will they relate to the more conventional analytical approaches via the behaviour of rational agents? Indeed, what kind of animals are they? I cannot, of course, go into the full details of these `inviting flora of rare equations' but shall try to provide a glimpse into their `closely guarded secrets' (using the formalism and definitions in Matiyasevich, 1993). Of course, the set ℑ may be so structured as to possess equivalence classes of properties, P and relations, R. Then it is possible also to talk, analogously, about a Diophantine representation of a Property P or a Diophantine representation of a Relation R.
For example, in the latter case we have:
[ ] Hence, the best we can do, as Political Arithmeticians and Accountants, and even as behavioural agents, however rational, so long as the constraints are Diophantine, is to act according to the gentle and humble precepts enunciated by George Temple: `collect specimens, to describe them with loving care, and to cultivate them for study under laboratory conditions'. Clearly, anyone familiar with the work of Charles Sanders Peirce will also realise that this kind of natural historic study fits comfortably with that great man's advocacy of retroduction 25 in such disciplines. The tiresome dichotomy between induction and deduction, refreshingly banished by Peirce more than a century ago, may well get cremated in economics, once and forever, if we combine the methodology of the natural historian with the epistemology that is implied in retroduction.
The headlong rush with which economists have equipped themselves with a halfbaked knowledge of mathematical traditions has led to an un-natural mathematical economics and a non-numerical economic theory.
Whether this trend will reverse itself of its own volition is very doubtful. But Hobson,1927, p.274: `It thus appears that an adequate definition of a function for a continuous interval (a,b) must take the form given to it by Dirichlet'. Hobson does not elaborate upon the meaning of `adequate', but it certainly had nothing to do with `performing a task'.
Of course, the motivation and criteria in the latter two approaches were quite different from those of Dirichlet and Kuratowski.
12. And set theory is only one of at least four sub-branches of mathematical logic; the others being: proof theory, recursion theory and model theory. Loosely speaking, but not entirely inaccurately, it is possible to associate one particular class of numbers with each of these subbranches of logic: real numbers, constructive numbers, computable numbers and non-standard numbers, respectively. Analogously, each of these forms the subject matter of: real analysis, constructive analysis, computable analysis and non-standard analysis. Which of these numbers and, hence, which kind of analysis, is appropriate for economic analysis is almost never discussed in any form or forum of mathematical economics or mathematics in economics. It is taken for granted that real numbers and its handmaiden, real analysis, is the default domain. Why?
13. Although it may appear paradoxical, I am of the opinion that non-standard analysis should be placed squarely in the constructive tradition -at least from the point of view of practice.
Ever since Leibniz chose a notation for the differential and integral calculus that was conducive to computation, a notation that has survived even in the quintessentially noncomputational tradition of classical real analysis, the practice of non-standard analysis has remained firmly rooted in applicability from a computational point of view. Indeed, the first modern rejuvenation of the non-standard tradition in the late 50s and early 60s, at the hands of Schmieden and Laugwitz (1958) , had constructive underpinnings. I add the caveat `modern' because Veronese's sterling efforts (Veronese, 1891) at the turn of the 19th century did not succeed in revitalising the subject due to its unfair dismissal by Peano and Russell, from different points of view. The former dismissed it, explicitly, for lacking in `rigour'; the latter, implicitly, by claiming that the triple problems of the infinitesimal, infinity and the continuum had been `solved'.
14. Jacob Schwartz observed pungently:
"The very fact that a theory appears in mathematical form, that, for instance, a theory has provided the occasion for the application of a fixed-point theorem ... somehow makes us more ready to take it seriously. ... The result, perhaps most common in the social sciences, is bad theory with a mathematical passport. ... The intellectual attractiveness of a mathematical argument, ...., makes mathematics a powerful tool of intellectual prestidigitation -a glittering deception in which some are entrapped, and some, alas, entrappers." Schwartz, 1986, pp. 22-3, italics added. 15. Robert Kalaba was present at a seminar I gave in the department of economics at the University of Southern California, at the invitation of Richard Day, in the early 90s. I posed a similar question at that seminar and he enlightened the audience with the interesting story that, at Rand in Santa Monica, in the early 50s, intense discussion took place on suitable mathematical structures for economic formalizations and it was not, at that time, a foregone conclusion that real analysis and some variety of formalism -particularly the Bourbakian version -would come to dominate mathematical economics. A few years later Lloyd Shapley, during a luncheon conversation, on the occasion of a visit by Alain Lewis to the Center for Computable Economics in the department of economics at UCLA of which I was then the Associate Director, confirmed that such discussions did, indeed take place at Rand, particularly with Norman Shapiro. I have never been able to go beyond these anecdotal observations to substantiate a clear cut case one way or the other.
16. A question I have been framing, posing and asking mathematical economists, in alternative ways, both formally and informally, directly and indirectly, for many years without ever getting any satisfactory answer. It is not that the issue has not been addressed by eminent theorists in recent and less-than-recent years (Gomory and Baumol, 1960 , ClowerHowitt, 1978 and Scarf, 1990 . I shall return to this theme in the concluding section, too.
17. The paragraph and page references in the six 'bullet points' are all to Debreu (1959) . 
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. That there will be a role for Shapley Values and a place for cooperative game theory in such a vision is exemplified by the fact that cost accountants have, for years, grappled with the problem of joint cost imputations and joint production by using these concepts in fertile and imaginative ways. Shubik was early to recognise such a role for cooperative game theory and Shapley Values (cf. Shubik, 1962 and Shubik, 1986) . There remains the problem that the domain of analysis for these concepts is the real number system. It will be an interesting challenge to device a formalism for cooperative game theory and its solutions in terms of computable or constructive numbers.
22. The lasting contribution of economic analysis, to the mercantile culture of the modern era, was -in my opinion -double-entry bookkeeping. The Political Arithmetician and the Accountant has to deal with credit as well as the debit side of such bookkeeping discipline and, hence, it is not enough to confine attention to equations constrained by non-negative numbers. Negative numbers, even in their origin, play a role in double-entry bookkeeping.
23. Simply substitute `economic theory' for `probability theory', when reading this quote! 24. I have taken the liberty of substituting Diophantine equations for differential equations in the quoted paragraph.
25. Even knowledgeable scholars persist in referring to retroduction as abduction, in spite of Peirce explicitly stating: `....απαγωγη should be translated not by the word abduction, as the custom of the translators is, but rather by reduction or retroduction'. (Peirce, 1898, p.141;  italics in the original).
